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Abstract
In the 1988 Presidential election George W. Bush used the issue of the
American ﬂag as a way to demonstrate his own patriotism while undermin-
ing Dukakis'. This strategy relied on valence issues, which are issues that
are generally considered to be desirable by most voters. Some authors con-
tend that these valence issues are important because they give a candidate
an additional advantage that is separate from his/her other issue stances. In
this thesis, I contend that valence issues are not considered in isolation, but
are instead integral to how voters determine a candidate's ability to handle
current and future crises. Using the 1988 National Election Study (NES) a
series of regression equations where estimated which found support for this
interpretation, adding to our understanding of the importance valence issues
and the American ﬂag. Additional studies are needed in order to elucidate
these results, but this thesis serves as a guide for future research.
1 Introduction: The Political Use of the American Flag
A recent article in the New York Times suggests that the American ﬂag is a sym-
bolic bludgeon used by Republicans to demonstrate to voters that Democrats are
somehow out of sync with the nation's values (Toner 2008). One psychologist
and political scientist, Drew Westen, underlines the absurdity of these types of
attacks by saying, unless you're talking about the Manchurian candidate, the
idea that someone who put their heart and soul into running for president didn't
care deeply for their country is kind of ridiculous (Westen 2008). However,
Republicans still seem to regularly use these attacks, causing historian Robert
Justin Goldstein to go as far as to say that Republicans have eﬀectively claimed
a monopoly of patriotism and a sort of divine right to the ﬂag (1995: 20) as a
political symbol.
This study asks whether this monopoly is politically advantageous. And if
so, why? Hershey (1989) and others (Shaw 1999a) argue that the American ﬂag is
a valence issue, which Stokes formally deﬁnes as an issue that involves merely the
linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by
the electorate (1963: 373). The American ﬂag is thought to be positively valued
since it represent the American way, which Orton contends is a conglomerate of
ideas and feelings including (theoretically) democracy, free enterprise, hard work,
competition, progress, national superiority, freedom, etc... (1973: 1340).
One problem with this conception of valence is that it does not take into
account the myriad of ways the American ﬂag is used during the course of a
political campaign. Historian Marc Leepson, is correct when he asserts that, since
the mid-nineteenth century, virtually every major party presidential candidate
had used the Stars and Stripes in advertising and as a prop at campaign stops
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(2005: 248). Most candidates use the American ﬂag to demonstrate to voters their
own patriotism, while others make the American ﬂag a campaign issue in and of
itself. In both instances, candidates are attempting to be perceived as being more
patriotic than their opponent, with diﬀering levels of success depending on the
campaign circumstances. Most authors (Enelow and Hinich 1982; Ansolabehere
2000) combine these diﬀerent uses of the American ﬂag into one valence constant
which is separate from other issue evaluations.
This is not an appropriate way to reﬂect why valence issues are important in
terms of voting behavior. Instead of valence issues being separate from a voter's
consideration of other campaign issues, I contend that valence issues inﬂuence
how people perceive other issues and the candidates themselves. Graber (1996)
and others (Edelman 1964; McCleod 1999) argue that some symbols are used by
candidates to demonstrate to voters that they stand for a numbers of desirable
qualities. Traits such as patriotism, leadership, and integrity are all involved in the
image of the American ﬂag, causing voters to draw candidates who they perceive
as being in favor of the ﬂag closer to their own ideal points while pushing away
candidates whom they perceive as being against the ﬂag.
This argument is consistent with what Berelson et al. calls the distortion
eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, Berelson et al. argues that partisans manage to 'pull' their
own candidate and 'push' the opposing candidate with considerable consistency,
leading voters to only see what they want to see (1954: 269; See also Granberg
1993). In terms of the American ﬂag this implies that voters will pull patriotic
candidates closer to their own ideal points, while pushing unpatriotic candidates
away. Instead of voters evaluating a candidate's patriotism as something that is
separate from their issue stances, I contend that patriotism is integral to all issue
evaluations. Given the interrelationship between the valence of the American
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ﬂag and other issues stances, a new approach is needed in order to deﬁne the
importance of valence issues to voters.
In order to empirically test this the approach that is oﬀered here I consider
how the American ﬂag was used during the course of the 1988 presidential cam-
paign, which saw George H.W. Bush defeat Michael Dukakis. Many commentators
claimed that Bush's success was partially due to his campaign's use of the Amer-
ican ﬂag (Hershey 1989; Leepson 2005). However, in 1988, the American ﬂag was
featured prominently in the printed campaign material and television ad adver-
tising of both Bush and Dukakis. In each instance, the ﬂag was used in order to
demonstrate each candidate's patriotism. Since voters were given ample evidence
for each candidate's patriotism it is diﬃcult to see how either candidate could gain
a discernible advantage. However, by focusing on the pledge of allegiance, which
Bush was able to demonstrate his own patriotism while undermining Dukakis',
allowing him to gain an edge. This strategy allowed Bush to essentially own
the ﬂag (see Petrocik 1996), which inﬂuenced how voters saw Bush in other issues
areas. According to one voter in Modesto, California, It's the patriotism thing,
the ﬂag - you know, the Pledge of Allegiance and all that. I'm not sure he'll be
able to do much about the deﬁcit, which worries me a lot, but he's patriotic, so
I'm sure that he'll try (Leepson 2005: 250).
Instead of compounding these diﬀerent uses of the American ﬂag into one
valence issues, I contend that these two uses of the ﬂag should be evaluated sepa-
rately. When this is done it becomes apparent that some campaign uses of the ﬂag
are more successful than others. Speciﬁcally, when the American ﬂag becomes a
campaign issue in and of itself, then one candidate gains a considerable advan-
tage, since they will naturally be perceived as being more patriotic than their
opponent. If voters ﬁnd this to be true, then they will naturally pull the patriotic
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candidate closer to their own ideal point, while pushing the unpatriotic candidate
away. This suggests that valence issues, like patriotism, are not separate from
the evaluation of other issues, rather they serve as an integral part in the way
voters perceive a candidate's ability to handle all other issues as well. Thus, if a
candidate is perceived as being more patriotic than his/her opposition, then they
will gain a considerable electoral advantage.
In order to expand on the approach that is being oﬀered here, this thesis will be
structure as follows. First, in section two, the details of what is being suggested are
presented in the context of the spatial voting model. In section three, the model is
expanded using the 1988 Presidential campaign as a foundation. In section four,
the National Election Study (NES) is used in order to estimate three regressions
which empirically test several of the arguments that are oﬀered, the results of
which are discussed in section ﬁve. Finally, in section six, the democratic and
political implications of these ﬁndings are considered with an eye towards future
research.
2 Passive and Active Valence: Reconsidering the Spatial Valence
Model
In the spatial valence model the value of the American ﬂag is encompassed in
a constant valence that is added or subtracted from a voter's evaluation of a
candidate's other issue stances (See Enelow and Hinich 1982). Let's assume there
is a given voter i who is deciding between two candidates, one and two. During the
course of a campaign, each candidate takes a position on the given issue, where θ1
and θ2 represents their respective stances. Voter i equally observes θ1and θ2 as well
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as a third variable, pij, which represents the patriotism of candidate j for voter i.
According to Enelow and Hinich, pij represents voter i's evaluation of candidate
one on a single nonspatial issue or dimension, or pij can represent the sum of
i's evaluations of candidate one on several nonspatial issues or dimension (1982:
120). In the latter case, each nonspatial issue or dimension is compounded into
a single term, pij. These are nonspatial issues because they are not things that
[a candidate] can erase to compete more eﬀectively for votes (Enelow and Hinich
1982: 115). Said diﬀerently, they are attributes that cannot be abandoned and
are beyond that candidate's immediate control (Enelow and Hinich 1982: 115).
Examples of nonspatial issues are a candidate's personality, religion, or, for the
purposes of this thesis, patriotism. This creates the following utility function for
the desirability of candidate one's issue positions,
ui(θ1) = pi1 − a(θ1 − xi)2
where ai is the importance that voter i attaches to the given issue θand xi is
his/her ideal point, or most preferred issue stance. Similarly, i's utility function
for candidate two is,
ui(θ2) = pi2 − a(θ2 − xi)2
This implies if ui(θ1) > ui(θ2), then voter i will most likely vote for candidate
one. This also suggests that an individuals evaluation of the patriotism of candi-
date, pij is separate from the evaluation of the candidate's issue position. Thus
voter i could still vote for candidate one even if θ1was further from xi than θ2,
as long as the degree that pi1 is greater than pi2 is larger than the degree that θ2
is closer to xi than θ1. There are two problems with this description of valence.
First, the spatial valence model does not help us understand candidate behaviors
that deﬁne pij in the mind of the voter. During the course of a campaign can-
didates use the American ﬂag in two ways to demonstrate their own patriotism
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(pij) to voters. First, the American ﬂag can be used in printed campaign material
and television commercials to passively suggest that a candidate is patriotic. For
example, a candidate may produce campaign buttons or pamphlets, which show
him/her standing in front of the American ﬂag in order to suggest that he/she is
patriotic. Similarly, a candidate can show the American ﬂag during a television
commercial in order to frame the topic that is being discussed. For example, a
candidate could show images of the ﬂag when he/she is discussing his/her tax cut
policy in order to suggest that tax cuts are patriotic and by association he/she is
patriotic. In both instances, the American ﬂag is essentially a passive addendum
to other campaign messages.
These passive uses of the American ﬂag are mostly ineﬀective because both
campaigns utilize these methods to such an extent that it is diﬃcult for one
candidate to gain an advantage. Gelman and King make a similar argument when
they suggest that campaigns help enlighten voter preferences (1993), meaning
that voters look to campaigns to determine each candidate's ideology and stance
on major issues. Berelson et al. (1954) argues that this results in political
reinforcement (1954: 269), since voters will pull parts of the campaign that
support their own predispositions towards their own ideal point, while pushing
the parts of the campaign that are against their own predispositions away. Both
of these factors cause the passive uses of the American ﬂag to essentially cancel
out, since voters will only see the ﬂag the way they wish to see it1.
1Of course this implies that campaigns do ultimately have an eﬀect on voting behavior (For
a review see Holbrook and Hill 2005 and Iyengar 1996), which is counter to those who claim
that the campaign has minimal eﬀects (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Finkel 1993)
or is primarily an assessment of the incumbent's performance rather than a choice between
candidates (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). Even though, Petrocik (1996) agrees with those who say
that structural variables, such as presidential approval, party identiﬁcation, and the state of the
economy are important (Abramowitz 1988, 1996; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992; Alvarez and Nagler
1995; Markus 1988; Kinder 1997; Campbell and Mann 1992; Greene 1993; Brody and Sigelman
1983; Erikson 1989; Rosenstone 1983) he still contends that issue positions have an important
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In alternative strategies, candidates can help enlighten voter preferences by
actively forcing an opponent into an unpopular issue stance. First, a candidate
can label an opponent's past decision as being against the American ﬂag. For
example, if a candidate vetoed a law that would have banned ﬂag-burning, then
the opposition could highlight that decision and suggest to voters that the candi-
date was somehow against the American way. Second, a candidate can choose
to advance a ﬂag-related issue in order to demonstrate their own patriotism. For
example, a candidate could say that he/she was in favor of making it mandatory
for students to say the pledge of allegiance at the beginning of each school day. In
this way, the candidate oﬀering the ﬂag-related issue is perceived as being some-
how in favor of the American way. In both instances, one candidate is using
ﬂag-related issues as a way to demonstrate his own patriotism and undermines
his opponents ability to make similar patriotic claims. The candidate that is on
the defensive from these types of active uses of the American ﬂag is placed into a
diﬃcult situation, because he/she has to respond to his/her opponent's active use
of the ﬂag without being perceived as being against the American way. Carmines
and Stimson suggest that this is a diﬃcult strategy to successfully deploy, since
voters tend to seize on to the valence of the ﬂag-related issue and ignore the pol-
icy details (1979). Hershey goes as far as to say that this causes the nation's
most serious challenges to get lost amid the thicket of ﬂags..., since voters re-
spond more intensely to symbolism of the American ﬂag (1989: 99, 100). All of
this suggests that candidates who actively use the American ﬂag to demonstrate
their own patriotism and undermine their opponents patriotism have a distinct
advantage, because in the end they are more likely to be perceived as being more
patriotic than their opponent.
independent eﬀect.
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If one is perceived to be more patriotic, then he/she not only seems more
credible in terms of the ﬂag-related issue, but he/she is also perceived to be
better able to handle all other issues as well. This contention is supported by
what we know about heuristics. First, most voters ﬁnd most policy issues nearly
impossible to comprehend causing them to rely on heuristics in order to make an
informed decision (For a review see Granberg 1993). Often times patriotism is
valuable in this regard because it serves as a surrogate for someone being in favor
of the American way. This is useful to evaluate candidate stances on current
issues and also to predict how candidates will be able to handle future crises.
For example, if a voter is considering which candidate's stance on the budget
deﬁcit is closer to his/her ideal point, it is natural for a voter to perceive the more
patriotic candidate's stance on the budget deﬁcit as being closer to their own
because to the voter that candidate is seen as having the country's best interests
in mind. Rather than wading through the mundane details of the budget deﬁcit
debate, voters rely on a candidate's patriotism as a surrogate for the desirability of
that candidate's stance on the budget deﬁcit, since voters trust that the patriotic
candidate's stance on the budget deﬁcit is more in line with the American way.
Similarly, voters can not predict all the possible scenarios that a candidate may
have to handle in the future. Rather than considering the details of each of these
scenarios, voters will simply assume that a patriotic candidate will act in the best
interest of the United States since by deﬁnition those who are patriotic love their
country (Merriam-Webster Incorporated 2004). This argument is very similar to
Brady and Sniderman's description of the likability calculus:
Our argument is that citizens can draw an impressively accurate map
of politics, of who wants what politically, of who takes the same side as
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whom and of who lines up on the opposing side of key issues. Citizens
can accomplish this, we argue, by relying on their political aﬀect,
their likes and dislikes of politically strategic groups. We focus on the
operation of an aﬀective calculus, or, as we call it, a likability heuristic.
This calculus is organized around people's feelings toward groups such
as liberals and conservatives. Clearly, many in the mass public lack a
ﬁrm understanding of political abstractions. All the same, many know
whom they like, and, equally important, they also know whom they
dislike. If coherent, these likes and dislikes can supply people with an
aﬀective calculus to ﬁgure out the issue positions of strategic groups.
We suggest that in this way many in the mass public can ﬁgure out
who wants what politically without necessarily knowing a lot about
politics (1985: 1061-1062).
In this way, voters use patriotism as a way to organize who is for the American
way and who is against it. Instead of wading thought the mundane details of
each candidate's issue stance, voters use patriotism as a heuristic for a desirable
issue stance. In psychology, heuristics have been used by many to describe how
voters process information (For a review see Granberg 1993). Sears argues that
peripheral/heuristic processing does parallel a piece of the symbolic or automatic
processing picture in that the individual responds without thoughtful review of
the detailed arguments (1993: 142). Thus, instead of evaluating the speciﬁcs
of each issue, voters use the patriotic symbol of the American ﬂag as a cue to
whether a candidate's issue stance should be preferred.
This discussion implies that voters will naturally 'pull' patriotic candidate's is-
sue stances closer to their own ideal points, while pushing unpatriotic candidate's
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issue stances away. This creates an incentive for candidates to actively use the
American ﬂag, because it forces the opposition into an unpatriotic issue stance.
For example, if one candidate were to claim that Monday should be a holiday
celebrating the American ﬂag, then he/she would be perceived by voters as being
more patriotic, because he/she is honoring the ﬂag more than his/her opponent.
Similarly, if one incumbent candidate vetoed legislation that would have outlawed
destroying the American ﬂag in protest, then the opposition could seize onto that
issue and use it as a way to show to voters that he/she is somehow unpatriotic,
because the incumbent would allow the American ﬂag to be desecrated for protest.
The symbol of the American ﬂag is particularly useful in this regard, because vot-
ers will tend to seize onto the valence of the issue instead of the speciﬁcs of the
policy, meaning that the candidate on the defense is always at a strategic disad-
vantage. In both instances, the candidate who is perceived to be more patriotic
has a considerable electoral advantage, because voters will use that candidate's
patriotism as a surrogate for the desirability of that candidate's issue stances.
To provide a formal context for the approach oﬀered here, lets reconsider the
spatial valence model (See Enelow and Hinich 1982). Recall, voter i is deciding
between two candidates. The candidates each take a stance on a given issue, θ1
and θ2, which the voter compares to his/her ideal point, xi. According to Enelow
and Hinich, the consideration of a candidate's patriotism (pij) is separate from the
consideration of θ(1982). However, I contend that valence issues (pij) inﬂuence
the way people evaluate other issues (θ). Speciﬁcally, as a candidate is perceived
to be more patriotic, voters will act as though the candidate's issue stances are
closer to their own ideal point. This establishes the following utility functions for
candidates one and two,
ui(θ1) = pi1 − ai(θ1(pi1)− xi)2(Candidate One)
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ui(θ2) = pi2 − ai(θ2(pi2)− xi)2(Candidate Two)
where, ai represents the importance a voter gives to a given issue θ. Notice, the
utility of θ1 and θ2 is a function of each candidate's patriotism. If a candidate is
perceived to be patriotic, voters will naturally minimize the distance between the
perceived candidate's issue stance and their own ideal point, where the inverse is
true if a candidate is perceived to be unpatriotic. Said diﬀerently, if a candidate
is perceived to be patriotic, he/she is considered to be better able to handle
all present and future issues, since he/she is considered to be reﬂective of the
American way. Conversely, if a candidate is perceived to be unpatriotic, then
the opposite is true, since voters believe that he/she is out of touch with the
American way.
3 Considering the Eﬀects of the American Flag: The Presidential
Election of 1988
The problem with the approach oﬀered here is that it is diﬃcult to estimate the
eﬀect of both passive and active valence issues since both are related to how
individuals perceive a candidate's patriotism. In order to isolate the eﬀects of
these two uses of the American ﬂag, we must consider the ﬂag's use in the context
of a given campaign. For this thesis, the 1988 presidential campaign was used,
since many commentators claim that the ﬂag played a signiﬁcant role... (Leepson
2005: 248; See Also Hershey 1989; Goldstein 1995; Toner 2008). In this election,
we saw a Republican candidate, George H.W. Bush defeat Michael Dukakis, by 315
electoral votes, carrying 53.4% of the popular vote (Leip 1993). In the campaign,
Bush primarily used the American ﬂag to demonstrate his own patriotism and to
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suggest that Dukakis was out of touch with the American way. Historian Marc
Leepson, oﬀers one telling example of Bush's ﬂag strategy during a campaign
rally on August 24, 1988. Standing in front of a large and prominently displayed
American ﬂag, Bush condemned Dukakis' veto of a 1977 Massachusetts law that
would have required school teachers to lead children in the pledge of allegiance,
and said, What is it about the Pledge of Allegiance that upsets him so much?
It is very hard for me to imagine that the founding fathers - Samuel Adams and
John Hancock and John Adams - would have object to teachers leading students
in the Pledge of Allegiance to the ﬂag of the United States (2005: 249). This use
of the American ﬂag was part of a larger campaign strategy that was supposed to
deﬁne Dukakis to the voters before he was able, or willing, to deﬁne himself. The
deﬁnition would be that Dukakis was a liberal in the mold of Walter Mondale,
Jimmy Carter, and George McGovern and out of touch with mainstream America
(Hershey 1989: 82).
In the 1988 presidential campaign, Bush was not the only one to use the
American ﬂag for political ends. Both candidates used the American ﬂag in order
to passively demonstrate their own patriotism. For example, by looking at selected
images of each candidate's campaign buttons, which are presented in Figure 1,
one can see that both Bush and Dukakis attempted to suggest to voters that they
are patriotic by superimposing their image onto the American ﬂag. In buttons
one and three, both Bush and Dukakis allow voter to deﬁne patriotism in their
own terms, whereas in buttons two and four, both candidates are suggesting that
the American ﬂag is related to their integrity.
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Figure 1: Campaign Buttons from the 1988 George H.W. Bush and Michael
Dukakis Presidential Campaigns
Sources: Daniels, Chris. 2008. Bush Sr. Campaign Buttons.
http://www.campaignbuttons-etc.com/bush.htm (May 4, 2008).
Daniels, Chris. 2008. Dukakis Campaign Buttons.
http://www.campaignbuttons-etc.com/dukakis.htm (May 4, 2008).
The similarity between Dukakis' and Bush's buttons is no accident. In each
instance, Bush and Dukakis are trying to demonstrate their own patriotism, which
they know is politically advantageous. Given the political advantage of being per-
ceived as patriotic, candidates also tie their policy proposals to patriotic images,
hoping that associating those issues with the American ﬂag will make them more
appealing. For example, looking at selected images from televised political com-
mercials, which are presented in Figures 2 and 3, one can see that both Bush
and Dukakis use the ﬂag to also suggest that their policies are patriotic. First,
Bush in an add entitled, The Mission, says, I'm a man who sees life in terms of
missions, missions deﬁned and missions completed. I will not allow this country
to be made weak again. I will keep America moving forward, always forward, for
an endless enduring dream and a thousand points of light. This is my mission
and I will complete it (See Figure 2). In this ad, Bush uses images of the ﬂag to
frame his message and demonstrate the patriotism of his issue stances.
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Figure 2: Storyboard of The Mission, Aired by the George H.W. Bush Presi-
dential Campaign on September 7, 1988
Source: The Museum of the Moving Image. 2008. The Mission (1988 Bush v.
Dukakis).
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/election/index.php?nav_action=election&nav_subaction=overview&campaign_id=174
(May 4, 2008).
Figure 3: Storyboard of New Era, Aired by the Michael Dukakis Presidential
Campaign on July 21, 1988
Source: The Museum of the Moving Image. 2008. New Era (1988 Bush v.
Dukakis).
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/election/index.php?nav_action=election&nav_subaction=overview&campaign_id=174
(May 4, 2008).
Second, Dukakis in an ad entitled, New Era, says, We're going to build
the kind of America where hard work is rewarded, where American goods and
American workmanship are the best in the world. That's what this election is all
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about...By working together to create opportunity and a good life for all, all of
us are enriched, not just in economic terms but as citizens and as human beings
(Figure 3). Again, in this ad, Dukakis is claiming that voters should prefer his
policies because they are patriotic.
Both of these passive uses of the American ﬂag are used to suggest to voters
that a given candidate is patriotic. However, most candidates tend to use the
ﬂag in this manner, making it nearly impossible for any candidate to gain a
discernible advantage. Leepson is correct when he says that virtually every major
presidential candidate has used the Stars and Stripes in advertising... (2005: 248),
which makes it diﬃcult for voters to assess who is more patriotic, making it mostly
ineﬀective as a way to inﬂuence voting behavior.
This is not the case when the American ﬂag becomes the issue. In this instance,
one candidate can actively use the American ﬂag in order to force the opposing
candidate into an unpatriotic issue stance. For example, in the 1988 presidential
campaign, Bush argued that Dukakis' veto of the Massachusetts pledge law was
unpatriotic. Dukakis suﬀered from this attack because of two strategic errors.
First, Dukakis delayed his response for quite sometime, giving Bush time to ef-
fectively label him as being unpatriotic, without any suggestion from Dukakis
that Bush was incorrect. Hershey goes as far as to say that at ﬁrst, Dukakis had
left the ﬁeld during the battle of patriotism. (1989: 86). Second, when Dukakis
did ﬁnally respond he did not choose to respond in kind, by suggesting either the
Massachusetts veto law was unpatriotic or Bush's use of the American ﬂag was
unpatriotic. Instead, Dukakis attempted to emphasize the constitutionality of his
veto decision. Many commentators believe that Dukakis' choices cost him the elec-
tion (Hershey 1989; Toner 2008; Leepson 2005; Goldstein 1995), with one, former
Democratic national chair Robert Strauss, going as far as to say that Dukakis had
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captured the hearts of seventeen lawyers and lost three million voters (Strauss
1988). Dukakis' error caused many to voters to view him as being so far left [he
had] left America (Reagan 1984 [Quote Modiﬁed for Stylistic Purposes]).
In 1988, Bush active use of the American ﬂag to undermine Dukakis' patrio-
tism, was more eﬀective than his passive use of the ﬂag to demonstrate his own
patriotism. This is not to suggest that passively using the American ﬂag has no
eﬀect, rather I am suggesting that in most instances passive uses of the ﬂag are
ultimately canceled out by the opposing candidate use of the ﬂag in a similar
way. In some instances, the passive use of the American ﬂag can be eﬀective, if
the opposing candidate chooses not to use the ﬂag in this regard. However, in
the 1988 presidential campaign, this was not the case (See Figures 1, 2, and 3).
What mattered the most in 1988 was Bush's active use of the American ﬂag to
question Dukakis' patriotism. If Dukakis would have eﬀectively responded, then
this may have not been a relevant issue, but since he delayed his response and did
not respond in kind, Bush was able to successfully deﬁne him as someone who was
against the American way. This caused voters to perceive Bush as being more
patriotic, leading them to perceive his other issue stances as being closer to their
own, where the opposite is true for Dukakis.
This patriotic advantage can be quantiﬁed by empirically testing two separate
hypotheses. First, I contend that the American ﬂag should have an independent
eﬀect on voting behavior in 1988. If this is found to be true, than we can conﬁrm
what Enelow and Hinich (1982) and I suggest, that the American ﬂag does have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on how voter's evaluate candidates. Second, I contend that this
eﬀect is due to individuals perceiving Bush as being more patriotic than Dukakis
and consequently perceiving Bush's issues stances as being closer to their own
ideal points while perceiving Dukakis' issue stances as being further away. In the
16
next section, each hypothesis is tested using survey data and evidence is found
which supports both hypotheses.
4 Research Design
4.1 Data Source
In order to test both hypotheses the 1988 National Election Study (NES) was used.
The NES was conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES) using
a pre-election and post-election survey instrument that averaged a little over 60
minutes to complete. The pre-election survey was conducted prior to November
8th, beginning on September 6, 1988, and was administered to 2,040 people. Of
those people, 1,775 were administered a post-election survey between November
9, 1988 and January 24, 1989. Using this data, several variables were constructed,
all of which are presented below.
4.2 Variables and Models for Multivariate Analysis
4.2.1 Operationalizing the Primary Independent and Dependent Vari-
ables
The dependent variable in the ﬁrst hypothesis was simply whether an individual
voted for Bush or Dukakis, with those voting for Bush being given a 1 and those
voting for Dukakis being coded as 0. The primary independent variable in the ﬁrst
hypothesis is the perception of each candidate's patriotism. However, since there
is no question in the 1988 NES, which directly assesses whether an individual
thinks Bush is more patriotic than Dukakis, a proxy had to be created using the
following question, When you see the American ﬂag ﬂying does it make you feel
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extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good? This question
was used because I assume that patriotic individuals will only vote for patriotic
candidates.
The dependent variable in the second hypothesis is the diﬀerence between a
candidate's issue stances and the voter's own ideal point on that issue. Since the
1988 NES doesn't provide many of these types of measures, the squared diﬀerence
between the candidate's perceived ideology and an individual's own ideology, will
be used as a proxy measure. Again, I assume that preferred candidates will be per-
ceived to be ideological closer to a given individual than unpreferred candidates.
In terms of patriotism, I also assume that individuals who are more patriotic will
perceive Bush's ideology to be closer to their own, since they perceive Bush to
be more patriotic, where the inverse is true for Dukakis' ideology. Again, this is
based on the assumption that patriotic individuals would not pull an unpatriotic
candidate's ideology closer to their own.
With these limitations in mind, three models were estimated. Model 1 (Bush
Vote Model) regresses the likelihood of voting for Bush on an individual's opinion
of the American ﬂag, controlling for each candidate's leadership, party identi-
ﬁcation, ideology, campaign interest, race, gender, and their perception of how
the country is going. Models 2 (Bush Ideology Model) and 3 (Dukakis Ideology
Model), linearly regresses the squared diﬀerence between an individual's ideol-
ogy and the perceived ideology of Bush (Model 2) and Dukakis (Model 3) on the
individual's opinion of the American ﬂag, using the same controls as Model 1.
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4.2.2 Logistic Regression Estimating the Probability of Voting for
Bush (Model 1)
Using a logistic regression, the probability of voting for Bush was estimated using
an individual's opinion of the American ﬂag, while controlling for other structural
variables. If PB represents the probability of voting for Bush then Model 1 can
be estimated using the following equation,
ln(PB/1− PB) = α + β1AMERICAN FLAG
+β2BUSH LEADERSHIP
+β3DUKAKIS LEADERSHIP
+β4IDEOLOGY
+β5REPUBLICAN
+β6DEMOCRAT
+β7CAMPAIGN INTEREST
+β8WHITE
+β9MALE
+β10RETROSPECTIV E EV ALUATION
An individual's opinion of the American ﬂag (AMERICAN FLAG) is a di-
chotomous variable, with those feeling extremely or very good when they see
the ﬂag coded as 1 (Positive Flag) and 0 (Negative Flag) otherwise. Bush's
(BUSH LEADERSHIP ) and Dukakis' (DUKAKIS LEADERSHIP ) leader-
ship were both added to the model in order to test whether individuals use the
American ﬂag as a proxy for a candidate's ability to handle present situations and
future crises. The four-point NES scale was used for both variables, with those
perceiving Bush (Dukakis) to be a strong leader being given a 3 and those seeing
Bush (Dukakis) as a weak leader being given a 0.
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Ideology (IDEOLOGY ) was coded using a range from Extremely Liberal (0)
to Extremely Conservative (6). For party identiﬁcation, the coeﬃcients β5 and
β6 estimate the extent to which Republicans (REPUBLICAN) and Democrats
(DEMOCRAT ) are diﬀerent from Independents (1 = Republican/Democrat, 0
= all others). To gauge campaign interest (CAMPAIGN INTEREST ), those
who are not very interested in the campaign were given a 0, while those who are
very interested were given a 2. WHITE andMALE were coded using the stan-
dard NES questions, with males receiving a 1 and females receiving 0. Similarly,
Whites coded as 1 while all others set to 02. An individual's retrospective evalu-
ation (RETROSPECTIV E EV ALUATION) of the United States was gathered
from answers to the following question, Would you say that things in the country
are generally going very well, fairly well, not too well, or not well at all? This
question seemed to be most appropriate, since it assesses the general state of the
country instead of focusing on one aspect, such as the economy. This variable was
converted into a dichotomous variable, with those seeing the country going either
very or fairly well being given a 1, and all others being set to 0.
4.2.3 OLS Regression Estimating the Perceived Ideological Distance
Between an Individual and Bush (Model 2)
Using an OLS regression, the squared diﬀerence between an individual's own ide-
ology and Bush's perceived ideology was estimated using an individual's opinion
of the American ﬂag, while controlling for the same variables as Model 1, except
2I reluctantly used the standard NES question to control for race. However, with only ﬁve
possible answer choices, White, Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Paciﬁc Islander,
or Other, it is impossible to determine how Hispanics or Latinos ﬁt into the model. This is
unfortunate since both Hispanics and Latinos may have diﬀerent views of the American ﬂag,
since some may claim allegiance to their native country. This suggests a future area of research
and a possible addendum to later drafts of this study.
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ideology. Model 2 is outlined in the following equation,
Bush Ideological Difference = α + β1AMERICAN FLAG
+β2BUSH LEADERSHIP
+β3DUKAKIS LEADERSHIP
+β4REPUBLICAN
+β5DEMOCRAT
+β6CAMPAIGN INTEREST
+β7WHITE
+β8MALE
+β9RETROSPECTIV E EV ALUATION
+iwhere i N(0, σ
2)
Again, no additional variables were added to the right side of the equation.
Given that, as Bush Ideological Diﬀerence decreases Bush's ideology is perceived
to be closer to an individual's own ideology, holding all other variables constant.
4.2.4 OLS Regression Estimating the Perceived Ideological Distance
Between an Individual and Dukakis (Model 3)
The squared diﬀerence between Dukakis' perceived ideology and an individual's
own ideology is estimated in the same way, using an individual's opinion of the
American ﬂag, while controlling for the variables outlined in Models 2. This model
is speciﬁed using the following equation (Model 3),
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Dukakis Ideological Difference = α + β1AMERICAN FLAG
+β2BUSH LEADERSHIP
+β3DUKAKIS LEADERSHIP
+β4REPUBLICAN
+β5DEMOCRAT
+β6CAMPAIGN INTEREST
+β7WHITE
+β8MALE
+β9RETROSPECTIV E EV ALUATION
+iwhere i N(0, σ
2)
The only diﬀerence between Models 2 and 3, is that the dependent variable in
Model 3 is the distance between an individual's own ideology and Dukakis' per-
ceived ideology, where Model 2 considers Bush's ideology. Similarly, as Dukakis
Ideological Diﬀerence decreases Dukakis' ideology is perceived to be closer to an
individual's own ideology.
There are two additional problems with this Model construction that are be-
yond the measurement problems outlined above. First, the dependent variable in
Models 2 and 3 is the combination of two scales, even though it is treated as a
continuous variable. This was done because it is diﬃcult to determine whether an
ordered or multinomial regression would be appropriate in this instance. Given
that, an OLS regression was used in order to provide a preliminary test of how
these variables operate. Second, and perhaps more serious, is the simultaneous
equation problem that exists between all three models, which suggests the need
for a two stage process. Unfortunately, the dichotomous and categorical nature
of the dependent variables, means that a two stage least squares can not be used.
This problem requires estimating a two-stage logit or probit model which is no
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trivial matter (Alvarez and Glasgow 1999; Rivers and Vuong 1988) and is worthy
for future consideration. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis and I
will proceed with caution.
5 Results
5.1 The American Flag Does Have an Eﬀect on an Individual's Voting
Behavior
The aim of Model 1 is to determine whether the American ﬂag has an indepen-
dent eﬀect on whether an individual votes for Bush, controlling for candidate
leadership, ideology, party identiﬁcation, campaign interest, race, gender, and an
individual's retrospective evaluation. If this is found to be true, then there is some
evidence that the American ﬂag played an important role in the 1988 presidential
election.
According to Table 1, those who see the ﬂag in a positive light are signiﬁcantly
more likely to vote for Bush, holding all other variables constant. Predicted
probabilities were constructed in order to tease out this relationship. Using the
Zelig R package, Model 1 was simulated 10,000 times, each time randomly drawing
the model's coeﬃcients from a multivariate normal distribution which has a mean
at the parameter estimate(s) and a standard deviation equal to the standard
error(s). Once this is done the simulated results are ordinally sorted and numbers
are drawn from the simulated predictions at 2.5% and 97.5%, thus establishing a
95% conﬁdence interval around each predicted probability (Imai et al. 2007a; Imai
et al. 2007b). These predicted probabilities and conﬁdence bounds are presented
in Table 2.
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As you can see, when all other variables are held constant, an individual's view
of the American ﬂag has a substantial eﬀect on whether they will vote for Bush,
with Model 1 predicting those having a positive view of the ﬂag voting for Bush
63% of the time as compared to 47% for those with a negative view. Additionally,
with limited overlap between the 95% conﬁdence bounds, which appear in the
parentheses below each predict probability, one can be relatively conﬁdent that
the diﬀerence (16%) between the two probabilities is substantively important.
When this diﬀerence margin (16%) is considered in the context of the 1988
presidential election, it becomes even more apparent that the American ﬂag played
a signiﬁcant role in the election outcome. First, Bush only won the popular
vote by 7.8%, which is well below the predicted probability diﬀerence. Second,
looking speciﬁcally to states where Bush had small margins of victory (≤ 5%), such
as, Illinois (2.09%), Pennsylvania (2.31%), Maryland (2.91%), Vermont (3.52%),
California (3.57%), Missouri (3.98%), and New Mexico (4.96%), it is easy to see
that a 16 point advantage could have been decisive. However, even if Dukakis
would have won all of these states, Bush would still have had enough electoral
votes to win the election (304). However, if you consider all the states within a 16%
margin of victory (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas) the story
becomes more compelling that the American ﬂag may have had substantial eﬀect
on the outcome of the 1988 presidential election (All Results from Leip 1993).
Several of the control variables were also statistically signiﬁcant. First, Bush's
and Dukakis' leadership was statistically signiﬁcant, with those viewing Bush as
a strong leader being more likely to vote for Bush, where the inverse is true for
Dukakis. Second, ideology and party identiﬁcation were also statistically signif-
icant, with extreme conservatives and Republicans being more likely to vote for
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Table 1: A Logit Model Estimating Whether the American Flag Aﬀects Voting
Behavior in the Presidential Election of 1988
Estimate
(S.E.)
(Intercept) -3.054*
( 0.668)
American Flag 0.669*
( 0.32)
Bush Leadership 1.788*
( 0.183)
Dukakis Leadership -1.664*
( 0.18)
Ideology 0.426*
( 0.091)
Republican 1.491*
( 0.31)
Democrat -1.622*
( 0.259)
Campaign Interest -0.621*
( 0.302)
White 1.472*
( 0.368)
Male 0.021
( 0.228)
Retrospective Evaluation 0.292
( 0.249)
N 993
Deviance 517.55
−2LLR(Modelχ2) 851.756*
AIC 539.55
* p ≤ 0.05
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Table 2: The Predicted Probabilities of How the American Flag Aﬀects Whether
an Individual Voted for Bush in the Presidential Election of 1988
Predicted Probability
(95% Conﬁdence Interval)
Positive Flag .63
(Extremely and Very Well) (.57, .69)
Negative Flag .47
(Somewhat and Not Very Well) (.33, .62)
Bush, where the opposite is true for extreme liberals and Democrats. Third,
WHITE and CAMPAIGN INTEREST were also statistically signiﬁcant but
in the opposite direction, meaning that individuals who self-identiﬁed as white
where more likely to vote for Bush, where those who are very interested in the
campaign were not.
5.2 A Candidate's Patriotism Does Eﬀect How Voters Perceive His/Her
Other Issue Stances
In order to test the second hypothesis, we must determine whether patriotism
inﬂuences the way individuals perceive candidate issue stances. As a surrogate, I
consider how patriotic individuals perceive both Bush's and Dukakis' ideology. If
patriotic individuals tend to perceive Bush's ideology as being closer to their own,
then we should ﬁnd evidence that individuals tend to pull candidates they perceive
to be patriotic (Bush) closer to their own ideal points, while pushing candidates
who are perceived to be unpatriotic away (Dukakis). Since we are interested in
how the American ﬂag aﬀects both the perception of Bush and Dukakis, two
models were created, the results of which are presented in Table 3.
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In Table 3, the American ﬂag operated in the predicted direction for both
Models 2 and 3, with those individuals seeing the ﬂag in a positive light, perceiving
Bush's ideology to be closer to their own ideology, where the inverse is true for
Dukakis. This statistically signiﬁcant result suggests that individuals in 1988 were
pulling Bush towards their own ideal points, while pushing Dukakis away, because
they perceived Bush to be more patriotic.
Further evidence of this is found when we consider the relationship between
leadership and patriotism. It is suggested by some authors that patriotism may
serve as a surrogate for a candidate's leadership (See Mueller 1973). Given that,
if one assumes that patriotic individuals will only perceive patriotic candidates to
be strong leaders, then the correlation between Bush's and Dukakis' leadership
and an individual's opinion of the American ﬂag should provide more evidence
of whether one candidate is perceived to be more patriotic than another. The
Pearson correlation between Bush's leadership and an individual's opinion of the
American ﬂag is .10, where the correlation between Dukakis' leadership and the
ﬂag is -.02. The diﬀerent correlation signs suggest that patriotic individuals per-
ceive Bush to be a better leader than Dukakis. This provides evidence that Bush
is perceived to be more patriotic than Dukakis, since those who are patriotic think
he is a strong leader, where the opposite is true for Dukakis.
A statistically signiﬁcant relationship is also found between Bush's and Dukakis'
leadership and their ideological diﬀerence, suggesting that individuals who per-
ceive either candidate as a strong leader perceive that candidate's ideology to be
closer to their own. If people thought that both Bush and Dukakis were equally
patriotic, then we should see an individual's opinion of the American ﬂag oper-
ating in the same way. However, this is not the case, suggesting that individuals
perceive Bush to be more patriotic than Dukakis. Since an OLS model was used to
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Table 3: Two OLS Regression Models Estimating Bush and Dukakis Ideological
Diﬀerence with An Individual's Opinion of the American Flag in the Presidential
Election of 1988
Bush Ideology (Model2) Dukakis Ideology (Model 3)
Estimate Estimate
(S.E.) (S.E.)
(Intercept) 9.625* 3.921*
( 0.911) ( 1.08)
American Flag -1.417* 2.263*
( 0.548) ( 0.652)
Bush Leadership -1.983* 1.749*
( 0.244) ( 0.293)
Dukakis Leadership 0.274 -2.376*
( 0.242) ( 0.288)
Republican -1.258* 4.442*
( 0.475) ( 0.573)
Democrat 2.098* -0.57
( 0.475) ( 0.564)
White -1.072 0.702
( 0.571) ( 0.676)
Male 0.298 1.407*
( 0.368) ( 0.44)
Retrospective Evaluation -1.122* -1.071*
( 0.42) ( 0.503)
N 1015 998
RMSE 5.814 6.88
R2 0.221 0.285
AIC 6464.753 6692.721
* p ≤ 0.05
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estimate the squared diﬀerence between two categorical variables, one is reluctant
to directly interpret the estimated beta coeﬃcients. However, if one considers the
absolute value of β1 in both Models 2 and 3, we can determine whether patriotic
individuals were pulling Bush closer to their own ideal points more than they
were pushing Dukakis away. Since the absolute value of β1 in Model 3 (2.263) is
larger than that of Model 2 (1.417), we can be relatively certain that individuals
were pushing Dukakis away from their ideal point at a faster rate than they were
pulling Bush closer. Given the simultaneous equation problem, comparing the
coeﬃcients for each model may be inappropriate. However, if one compared the
relative similarity of several of Model 2 and 3's coeﬃcients (Retrospective Evalu-
ation, Gender, Bush Leadership, and Intercept) one can ﬁnd evidence that both
Models are operating in a similar fashion. Given that, the diﬀerence between the
coeﬃcients for Models 2 and 3 are most likely substantively important, which
implies that the American ﬂag may be more eﬀective to politically demonstrate
your opponent's lack of patriotism, rather than your own.
The parameter estimates for the control variables were also consistent with
expectations, with Republicans pulling Bush closer to their own ideal points
while pushing Dukakis away, where the opposite is true for Democrats. How-
ever, there was no statistically signiﬁcant relationship found between Democrats
and Dukakis' ideological diﬀerence, suggesting that even Democrats were reluctant
to pull Dukakis closer to their own ideal points. This is not entirely consistent
with Berelson et al.'s contention that partisans tend to see what they want to
see (1954). Also, men seemed to signiﬁcantly push their perception of Dukakis'
ideology further away from their own ideology, which is interesting but unrelated
to the topic at hand.
The only result that was unexpected was the relationship between an individ-
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ual's retrospective evaluation and their perception of Bush's and Dukakis' ideo-
logical diﬀerence. One would expect that if Bush was perceived as being more
patriotic then people who believe the country is going well should draw him closer
their ideal points, because he is seen as a protector of the American way, whereas
Dukakis is considered to be more of a threat to it. However, Table 3 shows that
individuals who saw the country going in a positive direction tended to perceive
both Bush's and Dukakis' ideology as being closer to their own. If we compare
the absolute values of the coeﬃcients, 1.122 for Bush and 1.071 for Dukakis, then
there is some evidence that suggests that people who see the country as going well
are pulling Bush closer to their ideal points at a faster rate than they are pulling
Dukakis. However, since the diﬀerence between the absolute value of the coeﬃ-
cients is relatively small (.05), it is diﬃcult to say whether this is a meaningful
ﬁnding and not due to random error.
The similarity between the coeﬃcient estimates for an individual's retrospec-
tive evaluation does suggest that the importance of patriotism may have less to
do with the perception of a candidate's ability to handle current issues and more
to do with the perception of how candidates will act in the future. Recall, that
patriotism is an important heuristic because it allows individuals to determine
whether a candidate's issue stance is desirable without considering the speciﬁcs
of that stance. This was thought to eﬀect the perception of each candidate's
present issue stance, as well as the perception of each candidate's ability to han-
dle unforeseen circumstances. If the former is more important, then we should
see individuals who think the country is going well perceiving Bush's ideology as
being closer to their own ideology, since Bush's patriotism serves as a surrogate
for his ability to handle current issues. Since an individual's retrospective eval-
uation operated in a similar way for both Bush and Dukakis, evidence is found
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that suggest that a candidate's patriotism may be used more as a way to gauge
their ability to handle future crises as opposed to their ability to handle current
situations.
This interpretation is supported by the estimated coeﬃcients for Bush's and
Dukakis' leadership. If patriotism inﬂuences an individual's perception of a candi-
date's ability to handle current issues, then one would think that the coeﬃcients
for a candidate's leadership and retrospective evaluation would operate in a simi-
lar manner. However, this is not the case. The signs for the estimated coeﬃcients
for Bush and Dukakis' leadership switch as one moves from Models 2 to 3. This
suggests that an individual's perception of a candidate's patriotism is based more
on a candidate's perceived ability to handle future situations.
The ﬁndings outlined above provide evidence that supports both hypotheses
outlined above. First, Tables 1 and 2, demonstrate that the American ﬂag did
have a statistically signiﬁcant independent eﬀect on whether an individual voted
for Bush in 1988. As outlined in section two, this suggests that Bush gained
a patriotic advantage during the course of the campaign, which ultimately hurt
Dukakis. Second, Table 3 ﬁnds some statistical support for parts of the models
oﬀered in Section two. Speciﬁcally, voters tended to pull Bush closer to their
ideal points, while pushing Dukakis away. I contend this is due to Bush being
perceived as being more patriotic than Dukakis, which positively inﬂuenced the
way individuals saw Bush's ideology and other issue stances. These ﬁndings are
discussed in more detail in section ﬁve, but for now it is apparent that the we
should reconsider the importance of valence issues.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 Democratic and Political Implications
This study provides evidence that using the American ﬂag was a politically advan-
tageous symbol in the 1988 presidential campaign. Both the state by state returns
and Model 1's predicted probabilities suggest that the American ﬂag could inﬂu-
ence election outcomes in some circumstances. Speciﬁcally, in the election of 1988
Bush's use of the American ﬂag could have given him a considerable electoral
edge, that may have been decisive in several swing states as well as the popular
vote.
This study provides some support for Goldstein's contention that Republicans
owned the ﬂag in 1988 (1995), since those who see the ﬂag in a positive light
tended to pull Bush closer to their own ideology, while pushing Dukakis away.
This ﬁnding suggests that the Republican ﬂag advantage may inﬂuence other
issues, since it seemed to cause individuals to see Bush as being more patriotic,
which may be related to the perception of Bush's ability to handle future crises.
However, Models 2 and 3 also suggest that the American ﬂag may be more useful
as a way to undermine your opponents patriotism, rather than demonstrating your
own. However, since no comparative cases were used in this thesis, it is unclear
about whether this is more a reﬂection of 1988, Republicans, or both.
This study also demonstrates the pervasiveness of symbolic politics. Edelman
(1964) argues that political symbols cause individuals to buy into campaigns and
the electoral process. McCleod contends that these symbols of mass consump-
tion may seduce people into believing that a candidate is acting in their own best
interests since symbols like the American ﬂag utilize political persuasion and po-
litical rhetoric that is based on a system of fundamental beliefs about what it
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means to be an American (McCleod 1999: 360, 362). In terms of representation
this is problematic since an election is supposed to aﬀord voters an opportunity
to decide which candidate will represent them the best.
In the 1988 presidential campaign this issue of representation was particularly
problematic since voters tended to focus more on the symbolism of the Ameri-
can ﬂag and less on more important substantive issues. Hershey goes as far as
to say that, the nation's most serious challenges, too, got lost in the thicket of
ﬂags...(1989:100), permitting both campaigners and citizens to ignore the real-
ities of the candidate's abilities and the nation's needs (1989: 99). Even though
this study does not go this far, it does provide evidence that the American ﬂag
can be used as a valuable political tool, which suggests that the symbolic ideal of
the ﬂag may be somewhat lost (See Brennan and Rehnquist 1989).
However, this study goes to great lengths to suggest that context does matter,
and when considering the democratic implications of these ﬁndings I can not
emphasize this enough. One would think that when individuals see the American
ﬂag in the context of a presidential election they think of it in diﬀerent terms
than when they see it ﬂying above a capitol building or in front of their home.
Before we lose all democratic hope, future research is needed in order to determine
whether the symbolic meaning of the American ﬂag changes when it is used in
diﬀerent contexts. Until this is done, we can not place deﬁnitive judgment on
whether using the American ﬂag during an election is good or bad for democracy,
since those terms are relative to the speciﬁc use of the ﬂag and the election itself.
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6.2 Future Research
This thesis did not directly consider the importance of the image of the American
ﬂag. Drawing from primarily from work done in political and social psychology
(For a review see Iyengar 1993), Brader and others (Marcus 2000) suggest that
the importance of the image of the American ﬂag is based in the emotions people
attach to it3. First, the American ﬂag could be used to elicit an enthusiastic
response about a given candidate, which Brader suggests would cause voters to
associate the candidate with positive feelings about the American way (2005).
For example, if a candidate were to speak about his war record standing in front
of the American ﬂag, he/she would entice voters to see his candidacy as being
consistent with the American way. Conversely, the American ﬂag can be used
to elicit anxiety, which cause voters to question their previously held assumptions
and consider alternative courses of action (Brader 2005: 390). For example, a
candidate could show a television commercial which combines 9/11 images, images
of his opponent, and images of the American ﬂag, to suggest that his opponent is
out to destroy the American way. In both instances, the American ﬂag is similar
to other symbols and images, in that it elicits an emotional response and can be
added to other messages in order to cause voters to react in a particular way. All
of this suggests that considering the emotional appeal of the American ﬂag would
be a wise continuation of this study and should be the aim of future research
endeavors.
3The importance of emotions in political ads have been considered by many authors (Kaid
and Johnston 2001; Nelson and Boyton 1997; Kern 1989; Perloﬀ and Kinsey 1992) and have
shown that emotions play an often overlooked role in human decision making (Damasio 1994;
Kinder 1994).
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